webpki/cert.rs
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// Copyright 2015 Brian Smith.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES
// WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR
// ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
// WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
// ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
// OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
use pki_types::SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer;
use pki_types::{CertificateDer, DnsName};
use crate::der::{self, DerIterator, FromDer, Tag, CONSTRUCTED, CONTEXT_SPECIFIC};
use crate::error::{DerTypeId, Error};
use crate::public_values_eq;
use crate::signed_data::SignedData;
use crate::subject_name::{GeneralName, NameIterator, WildcardDnsNameRef};
use crate::x509::{remember_extension, set_extension_once, DistributionPointName, Extension};
/// A parsed X509 certificate.
pub struct Cert<'a> {
pub(crate) serial: untrusted::Input<'a>,
pub(crate) signed_data: SignedData<'a>,
pub(crate) issuer: untrusted::Input<'a>,
pub(crate) validity: untrusted::Input<'a>,
pub(crate) subject: untrusted::Input<'a>,
pub(crate) spki: untrusted::Input<'a>,
pub(crate) basic_constraints: Option<untrusted::Input<'a>>,
// key usage (KU) extension (if any). When validating certificate revocation lists (CRLs) this
// field will be consulted to determine if the cert is allowed to sign CRLs. For cert validation
// this field is ignored (for more detail see in `verify_cert.rs` and
// `check_issuer_independent_properties`).
pub(crate) key_usage: Option<untrusted::Input<'a>>,
pub(crate) eku: Option<untrusted::Input<'a>>,
pub(crate) name_constraints: Option<untrusted::Input<'a>>,
pub(crate) subject_alt_name: Option<untrusted::Input<'a>>,
pub(crate) crl_distribution_points: Option<untrusted::Input<'a>>,
der: CertificateDer<'a>,
}
impl<'a> Cert<'a> {
pub(crate) fn from_der(cert_der: untrusted::Input<'a>) -> Result<Self, Error> {
let (tbs, signed_data) =
cert_der.read_all(Error::TrailingData(DerTypeId::Certificate), |cert_der| {
der::nested(
cert_der,
der::Tag::Sequence,
Error::TrailingData(DerTypeId::SignedData),
|der| {
// limited to SEQUENCEs of size 2^16 or less.
SignedData::from_der(der, der::TWO_BYTE_DER_SIZE)
},
)
})?;
tbs.read_all(
Error::TrailingData(DerTypeId::CertificateTbsCertificate),
|tbs| {
version3(tbs)?;
let serial = lenient_certificate_serial_number(tbs)?;
let signature = der::expect_tag(tbs, der::Tag::Sequence)?;
// TODO: In mozilla::pkix, the comparison is done based on the
// normalized value (ignoring whether or not there is an optional NULL
// parameter for RSA-based algorithms), so this may be too strict.
if !public_values_eq(signature, signed_data.algorithm) {
return Err(Error::SignatureAlgorithmMismatch);
}
let issuer = der::expect_tag(tbs, der::Tag::Sequence)?;
let validity = der::expect_tag(tbs, der::Tag::Sequence)?;
let subject = der::expect_tag(tbs, der::Tag::Sequence)?;
let spki = der::expect_tag(tbs, der::Tag::Sequence)?;
// In theory there could be fields [1] issuerUniqueID and [2]
// subjectUniqueID, but in practice there never are, and to keep the
// code small and simple we don't accept any certificates that do
// contain them.
let mut cert = Cert {
signed_data,
serial,
issuer,
validity,
subject,
spki,
basic_constraints: None,
key_usage: None,
eku: None,
name_constraints: None,
subject_alt_name: None,
crl_distribution_points: None,
der: CertificateDer::from(cert_der.as_slice_less_safe()),
};
if !tbs.at_end() {
der::nested(
tbs,
der::Tag::ContextSpecificConstructed3,
Error::TrailingData(DerTypeId::CertificateExtensions),
|tagged| {
der::nested_of_mut(
tagged,
der::Tag::Sequence,
der::Tag::Sequence,
Error::TrailingData(DerTypeId::Extension),
|extension| {
remember_cert_extension(
&mut cert,
&Extension::from_der(extension)?,
)
},
)
},
)?;
}
Ok(cert)
},
)
}
/// Returns a list of valid DNS names provided in the subject alternative names extension
///
/// This function must not be used to implement custom DNS name verification.
/// Checking that a certificate is valid for a given subject name should always be done with
/// [EndEntityCert::verify_is_valid_for_subject_name].
///
/// [EndEntityCert::verify_is_valid_for_subject_name]: crate::EndEntityCert::verify_is_valid_for_subject_name
pub fn valid_dns_names(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &str> {
NameIterator::new(Some(self.subject), self.subject_alt_name).filter_map(|result| {
let presented_id = match result.ok()? {
GeneralName::DnsName(presented) => presented,
_ => return None,
};
// if the name could be converted to a DNS name, return it; otherwise,
// keep going.
let dns_str = core::str::from_utf8(presented_id.as_slice_less_safe()).ok()?;
match DnsName::try_from(dns_str) {
Ok(_) => Some(dns_str),
Err(_) => {
match WildcardDnsNameRef::try_from_ascii(presented_id.as_slice_less_safe()) {
Ok(wildcard_dns_name) => Some(wildcard_dns_name.as_str()),
Err(_) => None,
}
}
}
})
}
/// Raw DER encoded certificate serial number.
pub fn serial(&self) -> &[u8] {
self.serial.as_slice_less_safe()
}
/// Raw DER encoded certificate issuer.
pub fn issuer(&self) -> &[u8] {
self.issuer.as_slice_less_safe()
}
/// Raw DER encoded certificate subject.
pub fn subject(&self) -> &[u8] {
self.subject.as_slice_less_safe()
}
/// Get the RFC 5280-compliant [`SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer`] (SPKI) of this [`Cert`].
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
pub fn subject_public_key_info(&self) -> SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer<'static> {
// Our SPKI representation contains only the content of the RFC 5280 SEQUENCE
// So we wrap the SPKI contents back into a properly-encoded ASN.1 SEQUENCE
SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer::from(der::asn1_wrap(
Tag::Sequence,
self.spki.as_slice_less_safe(),
))
}
/// Returns an iterator over the certificate's cRLDistributionPoints extension values, if any.
pub(crate) fn crl_distribution_points(
&self,
) -> Option<impl Iterator<Item = Result<CrlDistributionPoint<'a>, Error>>> {
self.crl_distribution_points.map(DerIterator::new)
}
/// Raw DER encoded representation of the certificate.
pub fn der(&self) -> CertificateDer<'a> {
self.der.clone() // This is cheap, just cloning a reference.
}
}
// mozilla::pkix supports v1, v2, v3, and v4, including both the implicit
// (correct) and explicit (incorrect) encoding of v1. We allow only v3.
fn version3(input: &mut untrusted::Reader<'_>) -> Result<(), Error> {
der::nested(
input,
der::Tag::ContextSpecificConstructed0,
Error::UnsupportedCertVersion,
|input| {
let version = u8::from_der(input)?;
if version != 2 {
// v3
return Err(Error::UnsupportedCertVersion);
}
Ok(())
},
)
}
pub(crate) fn lenient_certificate_serial_number<'a>(
input: &mut untrusted::Reader<'a>,
) -> Result<untrusted::Input<'a>, Error> {
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.2.2:
// * Conforming CAs MUST NOT use serialNumber values longer than 20 octets."
// * "The serial number MUST be a positive integer [...]"
//
// However, we don't enforce these constraints, as there are widely-deployed trust anchors
// and many X.509 implementations in common use that violate these constraints. This is called
// out by the same section of RFC 5280 as cited above:
// Note: Non-conforming CAs may issue certificates with serial numbers
// that are negative or zero. Certificate users SHOULD be prepared to
// gracefully handle such certificates.
der::expect_tag(input, Tag::Integer)
}
fn remember_cert_extension<'a>(
cert: &mut Cert<'a>,
extension: &Extension<'a>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
// We don't do anything with certificate policies so we can safely ignore
// all policy-related stuff. We assume that the policy-related extensions
// are not marked critical.
remember_extension(extension, |id| {
let out = match id {
// id-ce-keyUsage 2.5.29.15.
15 => &mut cert.key_usage,
// id-ce-subjectAltName 2.5.29.17
17 => &mut cert.subject_alt_name,
// id-ce-basicConstraints 2.5.29.19
19 => &mut cert.basic_constraints,
// id-ce-nameConstraints 2.5.29.30
30 => &mut cert.name_constraints,
// id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints 2.5.29.31
31 => &mut cert.crl_distribution_points,
// id-ce-extKeyUsage 2.5.29.37
37 => &mut cert.eku,
// Unsupported extension
_ => return extension.unsupported(),
};
set_extension_once(out, || {
extension.value.read_all(Error::BadDer, |value| match id {
// Unlike the other extensions we remember KU is a BitString and not a Sequence. We
// read the raw bytes here and parse at the time of use.
15 => Ok(value.read_bytes_to_end()),
// All other remembered certificate extensions are wrapped in a Sequence.
_ => der::expect_tag(value, Tag::Sequence),
})
})
})
}
/// A certificate revocation list (CRL) distribution point, describing a source of
/// CRL information for a given certificate as described in RFC 5280 section 4.2.3.13[^1].
///
/// [^1]: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.13>
pub(crate) struct CrlDistributionPoint<'a> {
/// distributionPoint describes the location of CRL information.
distribution_point: Option<untrusted::Input<'a>>,
/// reasons holds a bit flag set of certificate revocation reasons associated with the
/// CRL distribution point.
pub(crate) reasons: Option<der::BitStringFlags<'a>>,
/// when the CRL issuer is not the certificate issuer, crl_issuer identifies the issuer of the
/// CRL.
pub(crate) crl_issuer: Option<untrusted::Input<'a>>,
}
impl<'a> CrlDistributionPoint<'a> {
/// Return the distribution point names (if any).
pub(crate) fn names(&self) -> Result<Option<DistributionPointName<'a>>, Error> {
self.distribution_point
.map(|input| DistributionPointName::from_der(&mut untrusted::Reader::new(input)))
.transpose()
}
}
impl<'a> FromDer<'a> for CrlDistributionPoint<'a> {
fn from_der(reader: &mut untrusted::Reader<'a>) -> Result<Self, Error> {
// RFC 5280 section §4.2.1.13:
// A DistributionPoint consists of three fields, each of which is optional:
// distributionPoint, reasons, and cRLIssuer.
let mut result = CrlDistributionPoint {
distribution_point: None,
reasons: None,
crl_issuer: None,
};
der::nested(
reader,
Tag::Sequence,
Error::TrailingData(Self::TYPE_ID),
|der| {
const DISTRIBUTION_POINT_TAG: u8 = CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CONSTRUCTED;
const REASONS_TAG: u8 = CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 1;
const CRL_ISSUER_TAG: u8 = CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CONSTRUCTED | 2;
while !der.at_end() {
let (tag, value) = der::read_tag_and_get_value(der)?;
match tag {
DISTRIBUTION_POINT_TAG => {
set_extension_once(&mut result.distribution_point, || Ok(value))?
}
REASONS_TAG => set_extension_once(&mut result.reasons, || {
der::bit_string_flags(value)
})?,
CRL_ISSUER_TAG => set_extension_once(&mut result.crl_issuer, || Ok(value))?,
_ => return Err(Error::BadDer),
}
}
// RFC 5280 section §4.2.1.13:
// a DistributionPoint MUST NOT consist of only the reasons field; either distributionPoint or
// cRLIssuer MUST be present.
match (result.distribution_point, result.crl_issuer) {
(None, None) => Err(Error::MalformedExtensions),
_ => Ok(result),
}
},
)
}
const TYPE_ID: DerTypeId = DerTypeId::CrlDistributionPoint;
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
use crate::crl::RevocationReason;
use std::prelude::v1::*;
#[test]
// Note: cert::parse_cert is crate-local visibility, and EndEntityCert doesn't expose the
// inner Cert, or the serial number. As a result we test that the raw serial value
// is read correctly here instead of in tests/integration.rs.
fn test_serial_read() {
let ee = include_bytes!("../tests/misc/serial_neg_ee.der");
let cert = Cert::from_der(untrusted::Input::from(ee)).expect("failed to parse certificate");
assert_eq!(cert.serial.as_slice_less_safe(), &[255, 33, 82, 65, 17]);
let ee = include_bytes!("../tests/misc/serial_large_positive.der");
let cert = Cert::from_der(untrusted::Input::from(ee)).expect("failed to parse certificate");
assert_eq!(
cert.serial.as_slice_less_safe(),
&[
0, 230, 9, 254, 122, 234, 0, 104, 140, 224, 36, 180, 237, 32, 27, 31, 239, 82, 180,
68, 209
]
)
}
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
#[test]
fn test_spki_read() {
let ee = include_bytes!("../tests/ed25519/ee.der");
let cert = Cert::from_der(untrusted::Input::from(ee)).expect("failed to parse certificate");
// How did I get this lovely string of hex bytes?
// openssl x509 -in tests/ed25519/ee.der -pubkey -noout > pubkey.pem
// openssl ec -pubin -in pubkey.pem -outform DER -out pubkey.der
// xxd -plain -cols 1 pubkey.der
let expected_spki = [
0x30, 0x2a, 0x30, 0x05, 0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x70, 0x03, 0x21, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x5a,
0x1e, 0x36, 0x6c, 0x17, 0x27, 0x5b, 0xf1, 0x58, 0x1e, 0x3a, 0x0e, 0xe6, 0x56, 0x29,
0x8d, 0x9e, 0x1b, 0x3f, 0xd3, 0x3f, 0x96, 0x46, 0xef, 0xbf, 0x04, 0x6b, 0xc7, 0x3d,
0x47, 0x5c,
];
assert_eq!(expected_spki, *cert.subject_public_key_info())
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
fn test_crl_distribution_point_netflix() {
let ee = include_bytes!("../tests/netflix/ee.der");
let inter = include_bytes!("../tests/netflix/inter.der");
let ee_cert = Cert::from_der(untrusted::Input::from(ee)).expect("failed to parse EE cert");
let cert =
Cert::from_der(untrusted::Input::from(inter)).expect("failed to parse certificate");
// The end entity certificate shouldn't have a distribution point.
assert!(ee_cert.crl_distribution_points.is_none());
// We expect to be able to parse the intermediate certificate's CRL distribution points.
let crl_distribution_points = cert
.crl_distribution_points()
.expect("missing distribution points extension")
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, Error>>()
.expect("failed to parse distribution points");
// There should be one distribution point present.
assert_eq!(crl_distribution_points.len(), 1);
let crl_distribution_point = crl_distribution_points
.first()
.expect("missing distribution point");
// The distribution point shouldn't have revocation reasons listed.
assert!(crl_distribution_point.reasons.is_none());
// The distribution point shouldn't have a CRL issuer listed.
assert!(crl_distribution_point.crl_issuer.is_none());
// We should be able to parse the distribution point name.
let distribution_point_name = crl_distribution_point
.names()
.expect("failed to parse distribution point names")
.expect("missing distribution point name");
// We expect the distribution point name to be a sequence of GeneralNames, not a name
// relative to the CRL issuer.
let names = match distribution_point_name {
DistributionPointName::NameRelativeToCrlIssuer => {
panic!("unexpected name relative to crl issuer")
}
DistributionPointName::FullName(names) => names,
};
// The general names should parse.
let names = names
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, Error>>()
.expect("failed to parse general names");
// There should be one general name.
assert_eq!(names.len(), 1);
let name = names.first().expect("missing general name");
// The general name should be a URI matching the expected value.
match name {
GeneralName::UniformResourceIdentifier(uri) => {
assert_eq!(
uri.as_slice_less_safe(),
"http://s.symcb.com/pca3-g3.crl".as_bytes()
);
}
_ => panic!("unexpected general name type"),
}
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
fn test_crl_distribution_point_with_reasons() {
let der = include_bytes!("../tests/crl_distrib_point/with_reasons.der");
let cert =
Cert::from_der(untrusted::Input::from(der)).expect("failed to parse certificate");
// We expect to be able to parse the intermediate certificate's CRL distribution points.
let crl_distribution_points = cert
.crl_distribution_points()
.expect("missing distribution points extension")
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, Error>>()
.expect("failed to parse distribution points");
// There should be one distribution point present.
assert_eq!(crl_distribution_points.len(), 1);
let crl_distribution_point = crl_distribution_points
.first()
.expect("missing distribution point");
// The distribution point should include the expected revocation reasons, and no others.
let reasons = crl_distribution_point
.reasons
.as_ref()
.expect("missing revocation reasons");
let expected = &[
RevocationReason::KeyCompromise,
RevocationReason::AffiliationChanged,
];
for reason in RevocationReason::iter() {
#[allow(clippy::as_conversions)]
// revocation reason is u8, infallible to convert to usize.
match expected.contains(&reason) {
true => assert!(reasons.bit_set(reason as usize)),
false => assert!(!reasons.bit_set(reason as usize)),
}
}
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
fn test_crl_distribution_point_with_crl_issuer() {
let der = include_bytes!("../tests/crl_distrib_point/with_crl_issuer.der");
let cert =
Cert::from_der(untrusted::Input::from(der)).expect("failed to parse certificate");
// We expect to be able to parse the intermediate certificate's CRL distribution points.
let crl_distribution_points = cert
.crl_distribution_points()
.expect("missing distribution points extension")
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, Error>>()
.expect("failed to parse distribution points");
// There should be one distribution point present.
assert_eq!(crl_distribution_points.len(), 1);
let crl_distribution_point = crl_distribution_points
.first()
.expect("missing distribution point");
// The CRL issuer should be present, but not anything else.
assert!(crl_distribution_point.crl_issuer.is_some());
assert!(crl_distribution_point.distribution_point.is_none());
assert!(crl_distribution_point.reasons.is_none());
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
fn test_crl_distribution_point_bad_der() {
// Created w/
// ascii2der -i tests/crl_distrib_point/unknown_tag.der.txt -o tests/crl_distrib_point/unknown_tag.der
let der = include_bytes!("../tests/crl_distrib_point/unknown_tag.der");
let cert =
Cert::from_der(untrusted::Input::from(der)).expect("failed to parse certificate");
// We expect there to be a distribution point extension, but parsing it should fail
// due to the unknown tag in the SEQUENCE.
let result = cert
.crl_distribution_points()
.expect("missing distribution points extension")
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, Error>>();
assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::BadDer)));
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
fn test_crl_distribution_point_only_reasons() {
// Created w/
// ascii2der -i tests/crl_distrib_point/only_reasons.der.txt -o tests/crl_distrib_point/only_reasons.der
let der = include_bytes!("../tests/crl_distrib_point/only_reasons.der");
let cert =
Cert::from_der(untrusted::Input::from(der)).expect("failed to parse certificate");
// We expect there to be a distribution point extension, but parsing it should fail
// because no distribution points or cRLIssuer are set in the SEQUENCE, just reason codes.
let result = cert
.crl_distribution_points()
.expect("missing distribution points extension")
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, Error>>();
assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::MalformedExtensions)));
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
fn test_crl_distribution_point_name_relative_to_issuer() {
let der = include_bytes!("../tests/crl_distrib_point/dp_name_relative_to_issuer.der");
let cert =
Cert::from_der(untrusted::Input::from(der)).expect("failed to parse certificate");
// We expect to be able to parse the intermediate certificate's CRL distribution points.
let crl_distribution_points = cert
.crl_distribution_points()
.expect("missing distribution points extension")
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, Error>>()
.expect("failed to parse distribution points");
// There should be one distribution point present.
assert_eq!(crl_distribution_points.len(), 1);
let crl_distribution_point = crl_distribution_points
.first()
.expect("missing distribution point");
assert!(crl_distribution_point.crl_issuer.is_none());
assert!(crl_distribution_point.reasons.is_none());
// We should be able to parse the distribution point name.
let distribution_point_name = crl_distribution_point
.names()
.expect("failed to parse distribution point names")
.expect("missing distribution point name");
// We expect the distribution point name to be a name relative to the CRL issuer.
assert!(matches!(
distribution_point_name,
DistributionPointName::NameRelativeToCrlIssuer
));
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
fn test_crl_distribution_point_unknown_name_tag() {
// Created w/
// ascii2der -i tests/crl_distrib_point/unknown_dp_name_tag.der.txt > tests/crl_distrib_point/unknown_dp_name_tag.der
let der = include_bytes!("../tests/crl_distrib_point/unknown_dp_name_tag.der");
let cert =
Cert::from_der(untrusted::Input::from(der)).expect("failed to parse certificate");
// We expect to be able to parse the intermediate certificate's CRL distribution points.
let crl_distribution_points = cert
.crl_distribution_points()
.expect("missing distribution points extension")
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, Error>>()
.expect("failed to parse distribution points");
// There should be one distribution point present.
assert_eq!(crl_distribution_points.len(), 1);
let crl_distribution_point = crl_distribution_points
.first()
.expect("missing distribution point");
// Parsing the distrubition point names should fail due to the unknown name tag.
let result = crl_distribution_point.names();
assert!(matches!(result, Err(Error::BadDer)))
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
fn test_crl_distribution_point_multiple() {
let der = include_bytes!("../tests/crl_distrib_point/multiple_distribution_points.der");
let cert =
Cert::from_der(untrusted::Input::from(der)).expect("failed to parse certificate");
// We expect to be able to parse the intermediate certificate's CRL distribution points.
let crl_distribution_points = cert
.crl_distribution_points()
.expect("missing distribution points extension")
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, Error>>()
.expect("failed to parse distribution points");
// There should be two distribution points present.
let (point_a, point_b) = (
crl_distribution_points
.first()
.expect("missing first distribution point"),
crl_distribution_points
.get(1)
.expect("missing second distribution point"),
);
fn get_names<'a>(
point: &'a CrlDistributionPoint<'a>,
) -> impl Iterator<Item = Result<GeneralName<'a>, Error>> {
match point
.names()
.expect("failed to parse distribution point names")
.expect("missing distribution point name")
{
DistributionPointName::NameRelativeToCrlIssuer => {
panic!("unexpected relative name")
}
DistributionPointName::FullName(names) => names,
}
}
fn uri_bytes<'a>(name: &'a GeneralName<'a>) -> &'a [u8] {
match name {
GeneralName::UniformResourceIdentifier(uri) => uri.as_slice_less_safe(),
_ => panic!("unexpected name type"),
}
}
// We expect to find three URIs across the two distribution points.
let expected_names = [
"http://example.com/crl.1.der".as_bytes(),
"http://example.com/crl.2.der".as_bytes(),
"http://example.com/crl.3.der".as_bytes(),
];
let all_names = get_names(point_a)
.chain(get_names(point_b))
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, Error>>()
.expect("failed to parse names");
assert_eq!(
all_names.iter().map(uri_bytes).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
expected_names
);
}
}