ring/ec/curve25519/ed25519/signing.rs
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// Copyright 2015-2016 Brian Smith.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES
// WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
// SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
// WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
// OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
// CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
//! EdDSA Signatures.
use super::{super::ops::*, eddsa_digest, ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN};
use crate::{
cpu, digest, error,
io::der,
pkcs8, rand,
signature::{self, KeyPair as SigningKeyPair},
};
/// An Ed25519 key pair, for signing.
pub struct Ed25519KeyPair {
// RFC 8032 Section 5.1.6 calls this *s*.
private_scalar: Scalar,
// RFC 8032 Section 5.1.6 calls this *prefix*.
private_prefix: Prefix,
// RFC 8032 Section 5.1.5 calls this *A*.
public_key: PublicKey,
}
derive_debug_via_field!(Ed25519KeyPair, stringify!(Ed25519KeyPair), public_key);
impl Ed25519KeyPair {
/// Generates a new key pair and returns the key pair serialized as a
/// PKCS#8 document.
///
/// The PKCS#8 document will be a v2 `OneAsymmetricKey` with the public key,
/// as described in [RFC 5958 Section 2]; see [RFC 8410 Section 10.3] for an
/// example.
///
/// [RFC 5958 Section 2]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5958#section-2
/// [RFC 8410 Section 10.3]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8410#section-10.3
pub fn generate_pkcs8(
rng: &dyn rand::SecureRandom,
) -> Result<pkcs8::Document, error::Unspecified> {
let seed: [u8; SEED_LEN] = rand::generate(rng)?.expose();
let key_pair = Self::from_seed_(&seed);
Ok(pkcs8::wrap_key(
&PKCS8_TEMPLATE,
&seed[..],
key_pair.public_key().as_ref(),
))
}
/// Constructs an Ed25519 key pair by parsing an unencrypted PKCS#8 v2
/// Ed25519 private key.
///
/// `openssl genpkey -algorithm ED25519` generates PKCS# v1 keys, which
/// require the use of `Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8_maybe_unchecked()`
/// instead of `Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8()`.
///
/// The input must be in PKCS#8 v2 format, and in particular it must contain
/// the public key in addition to the private key. `from_pkcs8()` will
/// verify that the public key and the private key are consistent with each
/// other.
///
/// Some early implementations of PKCS#8 v2, including earlier versions of
/// *ring* and other implementations, wrapped the public key in the wrong
/// ASN.1 tags. Both that incorrect form and the standardized form are
/// accepted.
///
/// If you need to parse PKCS#8 v1 files (without the public key) then use
/// `Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8_maybe_unchecked()` instead.
pub fn from_pkcs8(pkcs8: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, error::KeyRejected> {
let version = pkcs8::Version::V2Only(pkcs8::PublicKeyOptions {
accept_legacy_ed25519_public_key_tag: true,
});
let (seed, public_key) = unwrap_pkcs8(version, untrusted::Input::from(pkcs8))?;
Self::from_seed_and_public_key(
seed.as_slice_less_safe(),
public_key.unwrap().as_slice_less_safe(),
)
}
/// Constructs an Ed25519 key pair by parsing an unencrypted PKCS#8 v1 or v2
/// Ed25519 private key.
///
/// `openssl genpkey -algorithm ED25519` generates PKCS# v1 keys.
///
/// It is recommended to use `Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8()`, which accepts
/// only PKCS#8 v2 files that contain the public key.
/// `from_pkcs8_maybe_unchecked()` parses PKCS#2 files exactly like
/// `from_pkcs8()`. It also accepts v1 files. PKCS#8 v1 files do not contain
/// the public key, so when a v1 file is parsed the public key will be
/// computed from the private key, and there will be no consistency check
/// between the public key and the private key.
///
/// Some early implementations of PKCS#8 v2, including earlier versions of
/// *ring* and other implementations, wrapped the public key in the wrong
/// ASN.1 tags. Both that incorrect form and the standardized form are
/// accepted.
///
/// PKCS#8 v2 files are parsed exactly like `Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8()`.
pub fn from_pkcs8_maybe_unchecked(pkcs8: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, error::KeyRejected> {
let version = pkcs8::Version::V1OrV2(pkcs8::PublicKeyOptions {
accept_legacy_ed25519_public_key_tag: true,
});
let (seed, public_key) = unwrap_pkcs8(version, untrusted::Input::from(pkcs8))?;
if let Some(public_key) = public_key {
Self::from_seed_and_public_key(
seed.as_slice_less_safe(),
public_key.as_slice_less_safe(),
)
} else {
Self::from_seed_unchecked(seed.as_slice_less_safe())
}
}
/// Constructs an Ed25519 key pair from the private key seed `seed` and its
/// public key `public_key`.
///
/// It is recommended to use `Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8()` instead.
///
/// The private and public keys will be verified to be consistent with each
/// other. This helps avoid misuse of the key (e.g. accidentally swapping
/// the private key and public key, or using the wrong private key for the
/// public key). This also detects any corruption of the public or private
/// key.
pub fn from_seed_and_public_key(
seed: &[u8],
public_key: &[u8],
) -> Result<Self, error::KeyRejected> {
let pair = Self::from_seed_unchecked(seed)?;
// This implicitly verifies that `public_key` is the right length.
// XXX: This rejects ~18 keys when they are partially reduced, though
// those keys are virtually impossible to find.
if public_key != pair.public_key.as_ref() {
let err = if public_key.len() != pair.public_key.as_ref().len() {
error::KeyRejected::invalid_encoding()
} else {
error::KeyRejected::inconsistent_components()
};
return Err(err);
}
Ok(pair)
}
/// Constructs a Ed25519 key pair from the private key seed `seed`.
///
/// It is recommended to use `Ed25519KeyPair::from_pkcs8()` instead. When
/// that is not practical, it is recommended to use
/// `Ed25519KeyPair::from_seed_and_public_key()` instead.
///
/// Since the public key is not given, the public key will be computed from
/// the private key. It is not possible to detect misuse or corruption of
/// the private key since the public key isn't given as input.
pub fn from_seed_unchecked(seed: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, error::KeyRejected> {
let seed = seed
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| error::KeyRejected::invalid_encoding())?;
Ok(Self::from_seed_(seed))
}
fn from_seed_(seed: &Seed) -> Self {
let h = digest::digest(&digest::SHA512, seed);
let (private_scalar, private_prefix) = h.as_ref().split_at(SCALAR_LEN);
let private_scalar =
MaskedScalar::from_bytes_masked(private_scalar.try_into().unwrap()).into();
let a = ExtPoint::from_scalarmult_base_consttime(&private_scalar, cpu::features());
Self {
private_scalar,
private_prefix: private_prefix.try_into().unwrap(),
public_key: PublicKey(a.into_encoded_point()),
}
}
/// Returns the signature of the message `msg`.
pub fn sign(&self, msg: &[u8]) -> signature::Signature {
signature::Signature::new(|signature_bytes| {
prefixed_extern! {
fn x25519_sc_muladd(
s: &mut [u8; SCALAR_LEN],
a: &Scalar,
b: &Scalar,
c: &Scalar,
);
}
let (signature_bytes, _unused) = signature_bytes.split_at_mut(ELEM_LEN + SCALAR_LEN);
let (signature_r, signature_s) = signature_bytes.split_at_mut(ELEM_LEN);
let nonce = {
let mut ctx = digest::Context::new(&digest::SHA512);
ctx.update(&self.private_prefix);
ctx.update(msg);
ctx.finish()
};
let nonce = Scalar::from_sha512_digest_reduced(nonce);
let r = ExtPoint::from_scalarmult_base_consttime(&nonce, cpu::features());
signature_r.copy_from_slice(&r.into_encoded_point());
let hram_digest = eddsa_digest(signature_r, self.public_key.as_ref(), msg);
let hram = Scalar::from_sha512_digest_reduced(hram_digest);
unsafe {
x25519_sc_muladd(
signature_s.try_into().unwrap(),
&hram,
&self.private_scalar,
&nonce,
);
}
SIGNATURE_LEN
})
}
}
impl signature::KeyPair for Ed25519KeyPair {
type PublicKey = PublicKey;
fn public_key(&self) -> &Self::PublicKey {
&self.public_key
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct PublicKey([u8; ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]);
impl AsRef<[u8]> for PublicKey {
fn as_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
self.0.as_ref()
}
}
derive_debug_self_as_ref_hex_bytes!(PublicKey);
fn unwrap_pkcs8(
version: pkcs8::Version,
input: untrusted::Input,
) -> Result<(untrusted::Input, Option<untrusted::Input>), error::KeyRejected> {
let (private_key, public_key) = pkcs8::unwrap_key(&PKCS8_TEMPLATE, version, input)?;
let private_key = private_key
.read_all(error::Unspecified, |input| {
der::expect_tag_and_get_value(input, der::Tag::OctetString)
})
.map_err(|error::Unspecified| error::KeyRejected::invalid_encoding())?;
Ok((private_key, public_key))
}
type Prefix = [u8; PREFIX_LEN];
const PREFIX_LEN: usize = digest::SHA512_OUTPUT_LEN - SCALAR_LEN;
const SIGNATURE_LEN: usize = ELEM_LEN + SCALAR_LEN;
type Seed = [u8; SEED_LEN];
const SEED_LEN: usize = 32;
static PKCS8_TEMPLATE: pkcs8::Template = pkcs8::Template {
bytes: include_bytes!("ed25519_pkcs8_v2_template.der"),
alg_id_range: core::ops::Range { start: 7, end: 12 },
curve_id_index: 0,
private_key_index: 0x10,
};